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prefer the relative truth 
 
Abstract 
 
A report by Riinvest titled “Banking Sector: Facilitator or Barrier?”, funded by the Kosovo 
Foundation for an Open Society – KFOS (an affiliation of Open Society Institute – OSI), was 
prepared by Fadil Aliu (project manager), Alban Hashani (senior researcher),  Lumir Abdixhiku 
(senior researcher), Diellza Gashi (researcher), Ilire Mehmeti (researcher), and Shkëlqim Cani 
(international consultant from the University of Tirana – former Governor of the Central Bank 
of Albania). The report was published in Fall 2014. The main findings of the report in question, 
are: i) foreign capital is dominant in 6 out of 8 commercial banks operating in Kosovo, or 89.2% 
of total assets in this sector are managed by foreign banks; ii) all banks have enhanced their 
activity, increased deposits, assets, and lending; iii) the coverage of the loans by collateral, as of 
2011, was 236.1%, the highest in the region (Southeast Europe – SEE), thus the loans in Kosovo, 
in general, were paid back more than in any country in the region; iv) the banking sector in 
Kosovo is mainly concentrated in three banks that own 74% of assets, 74% of deposits, and 71.7% 
of loans. Riinvest identifies this as a very high concentration in the banking sector; v) highest 
interest rates in SEE (14.1% for individual loans, and 16.65% to business entities – SMEs); vi) the 
lowest SME to GDP ratio (28.3%),  indicating a very low credit intermediation and weak access to 
bank loans by SMEs; vii) highest profit ratio: Return on Equity (ROE) 14.5% versus the average 
by 4% in SEE, and Return on Assets (ROA) 1.4% versus 0.3%.  
 
Keywords: Kosovo, banking sector, interest rates, Riinvest, KFOS, organized crime, pseudo 
research 
 
JEL: E43, G21, G28, R11.   
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Introduction 
 
The findings of the Riinvest report suggest a kind of monopoly situation in 
Kosovo’s banking sector. To be more straightforward, the capital is in the hands of 
foreigners, they are growing, getting bigger, and making more profits as they go on. We 
may agree in this point and no one may doubt about it. The problem of this monopoly 
faced by the borrowers (or oligopoly among the lenders – banks), is that businesses in 
general are not growing in line with the dynamics of profits in the banking sector, thus 
causing a decline in overall welfare of Kosovo. The capital or money is flowing from 
someone (population and SMEs) to elsewhere, and a part of it is being concentrated in 
the banks as profit. How to change or improve this trend in order the benefits to be 
more spread among the stakeholders, or turn it into a win-win situation? Riinvest 
addressed several recommendations, but the problem with them is that when you do not 
properly understand the phenomenon, the recommendations, if implemented, can 
worsen the situation which it thinks can be improved.  
 
 
Misunderstanding and non understanding of competition by Riinvest 
 
Kosovo’s banking sector is identified as a monopoly since the second half of 1999 
when the first bank became operational. Riinvest wants more banks with its view that a 
larger number will bring about greater competition. In theory and practice of 
economics, this often does not stand. The number of banks is sufficient. Even the three 
main ones having the largest share in the market, would be enough should there be a 
competition between them. We often come across cases with only two companies in the 
market, but competition between them is very strong, therefore, the customers have 
many choices. Let us shortly discuss few examples in this respect.  
 
The car industry in Germany is dominated by three manufacturers, known as the 
“big three”: Volkswagen (VW), Mercedes, and BMW. VW is the second largest car 
producer in the world after Toyota. However, in the international market, it is faced with 
a strong competition by its home rivals, Mercedes, and BMW. Although VW has 
expanded its network in many countries not only by building its own factories but also 
by taking over other car producers (Audi, Škoda, SEAT, Bughati/Lamborghini, Bentley 
Motors Ltd., Scania AB, Porsche SE), still continues to face competition by Mercedes 
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which enjoys the reputation for stable and qualitative cars, and BMW for its cars with 
strong engines. The competition element here does not rest on how large the 
corporation is, but on product differentiation. A similar experience features two Russian 
fighter jets design bureaus, Mikoyan and Sukhoi OKB. Both are strong rivals of each 
other.  
 
After the 1999 war in Kosovo, a Swedish delegation was discussing with a 
Kosovatrans official about the demand for buses in Kosovo. The Albanian official told 
them of a need for 800 buses, and he was uncertain which country they should come 
from or be purchased. The Swede assured that Scania can supply them. I mentioned 
another Swedish bus producer – Volvo. The Swede watched me frowned. I did not know 
that he was affiliated with Scania, and why he was averse towards another bus producer 
from his own country. Later, I understood, and the explanation was: strong competition 
can occur even between only two entities in the market. But why monopoly is prevailing 
in 8 banks operating in Kosovo, excluding 17 microfinance institutions and several 
money lenders?  
 
A sound differentiation of activities and products by the banks in Kosovo is 
virtually non-existent. Whenever you go to apply for the loan, annual interest rate will 
be two digits, and related terms (payback, grace period, installments, mortgage, and 
collateral for the loan) almost the same. It appears a monopoly condition. Until now, no 
one, except an article I have seen by Florin Aliu and Rron Gjinovci (2014a, 2014b), has 
not tried (or did not know) to explain the truth about this monopoly, or oligopoly. 
Riinvest has only misunderstood and made its meaning more confused. According to 
Aliu and Gjinovci, the banks in Kosovo, namely the three largest ones dictating the 
market for loans, should have a hidden agreement or are colluding to maintain this 
oligarchic situation which suits them. The agreement does not have to be formalized in 
paper or through the meetings by the banks’ officials. This can be judged and witnessed 
by their behavior and the results. Competition forces one bank to introduce 
differentiation, then the chain effect of changes follows the rest of the banks. If a bank is 
large and profit making, following the firm’s objective function, which is maximizing 
the profit or enhancing the shareholders’ value, it can initiate the differentiation on its 
own to make more profit. For example, if the bank last year has lent €100 million at an 
annual rate of 10%, in future years will find it more profitable to lent €250 million. The 
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return on greater commitment of money as loans is higher profit, while more money 
available as loans to SMEs gives a push to growth and development of the real sector. 
Any bank would run after this profit, thus encouraging the rest to undertake similar 
paths, like VW with BMW and Mercedes, Scania with Volvo, and so on. This is not 
happening in the banking sector of Kosovo, and as already highlighted earlier, the 
public is not properly informed what is going on. The public further remains confused 
from pseudo-research and the propaganda of Riinvest.     
 
 
Why other banks from SEE are not rushing into banking sector of Kosovo?  
 
Current banks in Kosovo are growing by the volume of loans delivered, increased 
deposits, higher profits, but this growth rate does not follow businesses and overall 
welfare of the citizens. The latter are getting poorer as a result of wealth concentration 
in a tiny group of capitalists. The banks in neighboring countries have their difference 
in interest rates between the loans delivered and the deposits received lower than their 
counterparts in Kosovo. Smaller difference enables them to have their profit margin 
lower, as one of the main sources from which the profit is generated. In open market 
economy circumstances, nothing would stop foreign banks to enter for operation into 
Kosovo. Licensing or new entries, for which Riinvest thinks would increase competition, 
in fact has happened but did not bring notable changes. The same main banks in Kosovo 
(ProCredit, Reiffeisn, BKT, TEB) are also operating in the region. There they apply 
different but more favorable terms and conditions. This kind of double standard in a 
limited geographical area, raises the suspicion of a collusion between the banks and 
their affiliations at regional level, which appears to work at best only in Kosovo where 
profit rates are the highest, and that with a strong foreign currency such as Euro.  
 
Market economy and competition continue to be the terms which Kosovo 
officials prefer to toss around frequently more than by any in advanced market 
economies. On the current status as well as of a decade ago in the banking sector which 
is featured by high and unchanged interest rates, the official attitude is that “we have let 
it to the market.” If they truly would let it to the market, then why banks from SEE are 
not making their way through to Kosovo for more profit? Kosovo has got the so-called 
“Kosovo Competition Authority” and the Central Bank (with deficient power from 
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standard central banks elsewhere), which Riinvest had interviewed. And look at the 
findings:  
 
“Considering the fact that the banking sector performance indicators are among the 
highest in the region, the survey results [findings] conducted [you cannot conduct the 
results but the survey] with SMEs, Business Associations, the Kosovo Competition 
Authority, and other key stakeholders, substantiate their perception that credit 
conditions in the country are tight and not appropriate for business expansion; whereas 
the credit market is considered to be the main ingredient for Kosovo to catch up with 
sustainable economic growth and the cornerstone to address its socio-economic severe 
problems - unemployment and poverty. Despite the high profit indicators of the banking 
sector in Kosovo, the CBK hasn’t had any bank applications at all in the last three years 
to enter the Kosovan market which might be seen as [a] serious [a serious what? Good or 
bad?], and according to the CBK, this might be due to the evolution of global financial 
crisis since 2008, as well as the current public debt crisis in the Eurozone, which has 
affected a considerable number of banks in the European Union, and thus far has 
limited their further expansion of foreign financial institutions towards new markets” 
(p.7).  
 
So, it is a fact that the banking sector performance indicators in Kosovo are 
among the highest in SEE. The institutions in charge of monitoring and regulation of 
banking activities in Kosovo such as the CBK and the Kosovo Competition Authority, 
appear as observers giving their opinions for the phenomenon in the form of 
perceptions. This behavior of perceptions about major problems that they should deal 
with, is also present in many other institutions of Kosovo. We are not interested in what 
the CBK and the Authority think about the interest rates, but what measures they 
undertook or should undertake to improve the situation against which they are 
complaining. These two are in charge of doing something, not to serve us their opinions 
and perceptions. In any case, this interesting interview finding as what their opinion is, is 
either an incompetence of these bodies, or a wrong approach by Riinvest, or both. We 
get the impression that the problem rests in an invisible hand. If it exists, then the CBK 
and the Authority do not need to tell us about it – these should do their own job, and 
since they agree that the interest rates are very high,  then the opinions and perceptions 
given to us are useless. Actions are what matters after all. We have the right to provide 
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opinions, objections, critical reviews, and perceptions to the CBK and the Authority, and 
not the other way around, except in cases of our own research. But Riinvest has 
undertaken a research, which should have been called policy research working paper, 
with the aim to solely contribute to the way of introducing the changes in the banking 
sector. With current perceptions in place, the CBK and the Authority should register as 
NGOs to give opinions and perceptions as much as they can. Here is another citation 
from Riinvest’s report as part of their research methodology to collect perceptions of 
relevant institutions in charge of monitoring and regulation: 
 
 “CBK and commercial banks in contrast to SMEs evaluations [what is the evaluation by 
SMEs?], do not consider loan interest rates as being high, in fact they declared [stated? 
maintained?] that interest rates are on a declining trend” (p. 7). 
 
The earlier quote notes “to catch up with sustainable economic growth and the 
cornerstone to address its socio-economic severe problems - unemployment and 
poverty.”  We will discuss this issue later as the report by Riinvest addresses a 
recommendation about it. Furthermore, the CBK gives another opinion related to non 
application for licensing by the new banks (entries). Riinvest saw this as a serious issue 
despite that, as we repeatedly maintain, the number of entities in the market may not 
matter to competition which can exist between two banks. The next apology for no new 
bank licensing as a result of deepening of financial crisis since 2008 and increased 
public debt in the Eurozone, does not stand. The crisis in developed countries often 
pushes many companies to do business in less competitive markets in the developing 
countries. The consumers too, react similarly by buying cheaper products and services 
from less developed countries. This can be observed from the experience of recession in 
several Eurozone countries, and even depression that spread to Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, and Italy, while Turkey was experiencing a record of economic growth by over 
8%. The switch towards the goods and services of less developed countries during 
recession in advanced economies is an important cause to be investigated into more 
details. During financial crisis, we are biased to save our money or spent it more 
carefully. Instead of more qualitative and expensive German products, we chose similar 
cheaper products or substitutes from China and Turkey. If the basis of German products 
is quality, Turkish and Chinese products compete in the market through lower prices. 
The price in financial crisis may be the defining factor how much you will sell, 
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regardless the reputation of German products being more durable and reliable, because, 
under these circumstances, the consumers “patriotism” finds its way under the prism 
“lay your legs to the size of your quilt” (an Albanian proverb), which implies, you can 
buy how much your incomes can afford. The next claim by Riinvest, that deepening of 
public debts in some Eurozone countries that has affected many banks, is not a cause for 
non application of new bank licensing in Kosovo. We do not need to repeat that financial 
crisis in one country may push the banks to search less competitive but more promising 
markets. We are not saying the Bank of America, HSBC or Barclays should enter the 
small Kosovo market, but ideally it would be impossible for a foreign bank not to come 
and alone compete against all existing banks in Kosovo. Lateral impacts such as politics, 
corruption, crime, and so on, are not of interest to any bank while it can make profit – its 
main objective function. Public debt that Riinvest is referring is not of commercial 
banks but of the governments. Private commercial banks are not interested much if the 
government is too much indebted or has a surplus. Public debt in Germany cannot stop 
private banks if they want to do business in Kosovo.  
 
 
Misunderstanding and misinterpretation of numbers 
 
Some people, depending on their commitment and passion, are inspired to work 
with numbers. Some others prefer to describe the figures and extract the meaning. 
Neither the numbers nor the written text becomes boring if you try working with both. 
The students being averse of mathematics enroll in the law faculty. The aversion about 
the numbers withers away if you work with them, but not to the extent that you may 
become addicted to them and hesitating to write the text. The best approach to work 
with numbers is if you know their meaning and give a clear explanation to the reader. 
The report by Riinvest has many things in figures which any reader may understand, 
but the Riinvest “senior researchers” together with the “international consultant” from 
Albania, interpreted them wrongly. In some parts of the report, the justice system of 
Kosovo is blamed (somewhere by the banks) for being inefficient and very slow in 
resolving the cases. Riinvest takes this complaint as a serious issue and addresses a 
recommendation how to deal with it. However, the figures in Table 6, page 26, suggest 
something else about the bad loans as of 2011. Only 5.9% of total loans in Kosovo, 
resulted in “bad loans”, a share significantly lower than the average of regional 
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countries, and lower than in each country (Macedonia 8%, Bosnia 11%, Albania 18%, 
Serbia 19%, and Montenegro 25%). The source of these figures is noted by Riinvest as 
“EBRD Transition Reports, for Kosovo IMF estimation of GDP and CBK Annual Report.” 
The EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and the IMF 
(International Monetary Fund) figures, appear to have been reminded in Table 9, page 
50, titled “The region’s NPL (Non-Performing Loans) indicator.” The source of the 
figures says “Central Banks Annual reports of respective countries” (no titles, no years of 
publication, no place of publication, no page, and the list of references in the end is 
incomplete and with an awful style) where, Kosovo in 2005 had only 2% of NPLs, while 
Albania 2.3%. In 2011 this share in Kosovo has risen to around 6%, or nearly three times 
lower in percentage terms than 17% in Albania.    
 
Such a difference in the share of bad loans in itself suggests that Kosovo courts 
and the judiciary had much lesser work in the region. This can be proven by the figures 
that Riinvest is referring to. If the ratio of covering the loans by collateral in Kosovo 
stood at 236.1% versus 126.6% in regional countries, then it may be argued that the 
courts there have been twice as inefficient, or their level of commitment and work was 
much smaller than those of Kosovo. Why should we blame the courts and the justice 
system for inefficiency if you as a bank and business continue to have your loans 
guaranteed by the collateral at a significantly higher level than in SEE? To judge the 
justice system as inefficient in the sector where it had less work, is groundless. More 
unresolved problems are an indication of judicial inefficiency, not less or few. In the rest 
of society sectors, the justice system is not as inefficient as Riinvest may think, but it is 
blackmailed, deeply corrupt, and with large scale scandals in which EULEX is also 
involved. These are different stories not related to bad loans. Among others, Kosovo 
courts are manipulated by Riinvest We will discuss this problem later.  
  
“Senior researchers” and the “international consultant”, instead of assumptions, 
have not deemed as necessary referring to foreclosure procedures on business 
transactions. They certainly did not know where to refer. We are recommending where 
they should have to. In their report, the last year of reference is 2011, though the report 
was prepared and published in Fall 2014. The report appears to be of a foregone period 
missing the data on recent years in which the readers would be mostly interested. In any 
case, we are explaining a little the problem of “lengthy procedures” in the courts to 
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resolve the disputes, at the time. According to the World Bank (2011), Doing Business 
2011: Making a Difference for Enterprenues, Washington D.C.: World Bank, p. 174, 
Kosovo ranked 31st in “closing the business”, and 32nd in the component of “getting 
credit”. Where did Kosovo stand by these indicators with respect to SEE countries? 
Albania was ranked much better (15) in the ease of “getting credit”, but in “closing the 
business” was somewhere at the bottom of all countries (183). If you have (had in 2011) a 
problem with bad loans in Albania and were required to pursue the case in the courts to 
the end, the procedures were astronomically lengthy. Bosnia ranked 65th in “getting 
credit”, Macedonia 46, Montenegro 32 (where Kosovo stood), and Serbia 15. Access to 
credit in Kosovo did not appear more difficult as Riinvest reported. In Bosnia, and 
Macedonia it was more difficult. After Albania, each country in the region had more 
complicated and lengthy procedures in closing the business than Kosovo, with the 
following rankings: Macedonia 116, Serbia 86, Bosnia 73, and Montenegro 47. We may 
conclude that “lengthy court procedures” for businesses in Kosovo, is a speculation by 
Riinvest not backed by indicators.  
 
 
Missing the point with recommendations 
 
In order to overcome or alleviate the barriers “identified” (although much of 
them are misunderstood), Riinvest addressed a number of recommendations. The first 
or the main one, recommends the Government to strengthen economic growth by 
reforming the business environment. This recommendation should be explained in two 
parts; the one about economic growth, and the other referred to reforming the business 
environment. Economic growth is another reality from the concepts that Riinvest 
researchers have leered it from the textbooks of economics. All of them, including the 
Kosovo President, Atifete Jahjaga, think that only economic growth can lower 
unemployment rate and poverty. But how this growth should operate to affect 
employment and poverty reduction? In an environment of classical capitalism such the 
one operating in Kosovo, strong economic growth (e.g. 8-10% annually), if it happens, it 
does not imply that it can follow the rise in employment and decrease in poverty rate. 
This happens when the gap in income differences widens through accumulation of 
capital by few at the expense of the rest of population. Riinvest admits that the banks 
(the few) are growing at a faster rate than elsewhere in SEE, while complains that the 
10 
 
situation of SMEs (the rest) is becoming more difficult. The economy may grow at a rate 
of 10%, though this growth may be concentrated in few oligarchs who swallow the small 
fish. Economic growth, measured by the rise of GDP, is different from national incomes. 
By a simple definition, GDP measures the total value of goods and services produced 
within a year in a given country. A 10% GDP growth does not correspond to anyone’s 
income. To get incomes from GDP, as Piketty (2014) maintains, one must deduct 
buildings, infrastructure, machinery, vehicles, computers produced in the same year. 
This is where many economists get mislead when recommending the policy of 
economic growth versus incomes. A lot of public and private construction activities go 
on in Kosovo. They are counted as a contribution to GDP – economic growth. 
Investment choices as a component of GDP, affect differently incomes. If Kosovo gets 
more highways and other public infrastructure investment, that does increase GDP but 
not incomes which it can even lower. A similar pattern can be observed among private 
investment. Most Kosovo households spend their incomes and life earnings in buildings 
and houses, beyond their needs if incomes permit. Often this does not stop them leaving 
Kosovo as asylum seekers in the West, not for better and larger buildings but incomes. 
The incomes may get concentrated somewhere else. Three banks in Kosovo have the 
overwhelming majority of capital and incomes in the banking sector. What is their 
impact in increasing employment and poverty reduction for the rest of population? 
They do not run after increasing employment and alleviating poverty of others, but 
after their own profit.  
Second, in terms of the first recommendation, is when Riinvest recommends 
reforming the business environment to serve higher economic growth at the time when 
Kosovo has already these reforms in place. The environment, as measured by the ease of 
doing business in 2015, indicates Kosovo in the rank 42 for “starting a business”, a sharp 
improvement from 2014 when it was in 100th place. In this component, Albania ranked 
close before Kosovo (41), but Croatia (88) and Bosnia (147) were apparently behind. In 
“registering property” Kosovo made a small improvement from 35 to 34, which is much 
ahead of Albania (118), Bosnia (88) and other SEE countries. The rank 23rd in “getting 
credit” is below the regional average, implying a better access to credit. Kosovo made a 
little regress (from 58 to 63) in “paying taxes”, though this indicator fares better in 
ranking than in the regional countries. One important component on the ease of doing 
business, in which Kosovo stands behind all SEE, is “closing the business” (164th). We 
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should not forget that this is an unrelated indicator to the period which Riinvest refers to 
(2011, a difference of four years) for the same component. In 2011, Kosovo was ranked 
the best, and in 2015 the worst in the region on “closing the business.” In this way, 
Riinvest says the other way around. In American popular jargon, this is a typical 
“putting the cart before the horse.” It is not a minor mistake; it is a special “research 
methodology” by Riinvest which it practices and insists to impose upon others for a long 
time. Normal scholars would consider it a dishonest approach at best. The source for the 
figures referred to in this paragraph, is: World Bank (2014), Doing Business 2015: Going 
Beyond Efficiency – Economy Profile 2015 – Kosovo, 12th ed., Washington D.C.: World 
Bank.  
The second and the third recommendation is first addressed as a critique against 
the current state of judicial system which it calls as “highly unsatisfactory”, then 
highlights that “the absence of an effective and efficient mechanism in quickly solving 
bank court cases hinders the incentives for lowering current interest rates.” This part of 
the recommendation has only linguist connection between the formulated words, but 
not any meaning to the phenomenon. Riinvest sees lowering the interest rates through 
the courts, which in the situation as they were in 2011, had less work in SEE as only 
around 6% of total loans delivered by the banks amounted to as “bad loans”. What kind 
of recommendation would Riinvest address to the courts in Montenegro with not less 
than a quarter of total loans delivered ending up as “bad loans?” Riinvest goes further to 
recommend Kosovo the establishment of special economic courts to deal with and 
resolve business disputes (in this case, the claims of the banks over bad loans) separately 
from general cases that “would contribute to reducing significantly the current 
workload. This would eliminate one of the primary barriers of court inefficiency, which 
banks and businesses declare all the time.” Special economic courts, to do, what? Where 
does Riinvest see all that “current workload” with only 6%? Please note that there are no 
data available in the report after 2011 about the “current workload.” Why it does 
consider this as “one of the primary barriers of court inefficiency?” If the banks and the 
SMEs surveyed have referred to this as inefficiency, then both parties were not right. If 
the banks are highly unsatisfied with the business rule of law, they can freely go to 
Montenegro, Serbia, and other countries of the Western Balkans to enjoy much higher 
workloads and less efficient court procedures. These banks will probably find themselves 
better off there if they are convinced of better business environment, where profit rates 
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are smaller, and up to 25% of the loans being bad loans. OK then, let us establish and 
put into action special economic courts to deal with that 6%. What else! Can we bring to 
zero the share of bad loans from the total? Absolutely not. In no country this can happen 
for a long time. Competition between businesses does not allow all of them to thrive – 
some for various reasons and circumstances fail, new ones emerge). What impact 0% 
bad loans would have on interest rates if we were to implement this recommendation 
with full effects and desired outcome? Such a special court in principle can have adverse 
effects leading to higher interest rates, and not the other way around. Why? Even under 
current high interest rates, bad loans are proportionally much lower and less than in the 
rest of SEE. A further tightening by a special economic court, inevitably would 
encourage the banks to make loan terms and conditions harsher. The banks in their 
current conditions are already doing well, and prefer to go on that way undisturbed. 
Certainly, they support the recommendation by Riinvest for a special economic court to 
make themselves better off at the expense of SMEs and many others.  
 
The third recommendation is related to increasing competition in the banking 
sector, as a solution to the problem (which problem? Interest rates, the volume of loans, 
or business development?). Riinvest assumes this can work by attracting foreign direct 
investment in the banking sector. For what purpose? To increase competition, or to 
make the share of foreign capital of 89.2% go up to 100%? What meaning Kosovo as a 
country would have if 100% of assets in the banking sector end up in foreign hands? It is 
possible to make the assets in the banking sector 100% foreign owned, the banks 
competitive between each other, but then Riinvest should name the next report “The 
Banking Sector in Kosovo, but not of Kosovo.” CBK and Kosovo Competition Authority 
would be unnecessary, as they are partially even now.   
 
Another recommendation says that the Government and the CBK should 
undertake “a campaign to encourage the banks to move from their status quo position 
with regard to interest rates” in a sense of lowering them. It further states that this does 
not imply intervention into the banks’ internal affairs, but through a “mutual 
understanding”, in other words, that is to require mercy from the banks. If this 
recommendation is applicable, which practically it is not, it is Riinvest with an earlier 
recommendation for the establishment of the special economic court that runs counter 
to the requirement of “mutual understanding.” We discussed earlier how the 
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recommendation on special economic court, if implemented, encourages the banks to 
further increase already high interest rates, and now Riinvest requires their lowering 
through “mutual understanding.” This is a “research methodology and expertise” of 
Riinvest only. In addition, Riinvest recommended the CBK and the commercial banks to 
lower the level of collateral required for the loan below the average of SEE, and 
considered it as an improvement of supply for credit to SMEs in the longer run. This 
recommendation is contradicted by the figures which Rinvest has used. Why should the 
banks lower the collateral for the loan when in current level is the main guarantee and 
working well? Lowering it from over 236% of the loan value, may encourage the banks 
to become more restrictive in lending. The banks, if it is possible, would like the 
collateral to be as high as 400% of the loan. The higher the value of collateral, the banks 
will be ready to lend more. If someone wants a loan of €100 000 from you, and you offer 
the collateral worth €236 000, would you lent him/her the money? Of course you would. 
The banks have no reason to consider lowering the requirement level of collateral. It is 
(was in 2011) working well, covering the loans at much higher level than elsewhere in 
SEE, with higher interest rates, and eventually, producing the least risk level as the 
lowest share of bad loans suggest.    
 
The last recommendation is addressed to the Government, advising it to “improve 
financial literacy of entrepreneurs and individuals through the creation of business 
advice centers.” It proposes the organization of trainings free of charge to prepare 
business plans. The trainings would be organized and funded by donors, NGOs, 
Government, business associations and the bankers’ association. So many entities in 
training for business plans! The only entity that mostly needs training, but not for 
money in a dishonest way, is Riinvest which does not want to improve its research 
literacy. Riinvest operates on the basis of lies, slanders, and organized crime. This reality 
must be seen separately from true honest research to which Riinvest has no connection. 
Its president Muhamet Mustafa is a product of former Yugoslav UDB (Uprava Državne 
Bezbednosti – State Security Directorate). His father Mullah Syla as a religious cleric was 
a public agent of UDB, dealing with similar activities against others like his son. 
Muhamet’s closest collaborator and co-founder of Riinvest is Isa Mustafa, present Prime 
Minister of Kosovo, who made a political coalition with the PDK (Democratic Party of 
Kosovo) of Hashim Thaçi, despite numerous official statements with the content “never 
with PDK and Hashim Thaçi”, whom he publicly accused of assassinating a number of 
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LDK (Democratic League of Kosovo) officials. Dempsey and Fontaine (2001), based on 
investigative reports by KFOR and UN police, report of a total 24 assassinations since the 
war ended (mid June 1999) to 2001 only. The bulk of these assassinations was directly 
blamed on Hashim Thaçi’s clan. A group of LDK MPs splitting with Isa Mustafa because 
of his joining with Thaçi, want an accountability for LDK officials assassinated. There 
are rumors that Mr. Mustafa after his repeated “never and never”, joined Mr. Thaçi’s to 
form a governmental coalition after the fear that he may end up in jail from Mr. Thaçi’s 
clan. Not less than 70 caseloads with serious charges against Mr. Mustafa rest on Kosovo 
courts. When he was able to save himself through Mr. Thaçi, why should he bother of 
dozens of LDK officials assassinated by Thaçi’s clan? It was not only Thaçi’s clan 
assassinating LDK officials. In October 2011, a teacher of biology went to the municipal 
building of Pristina, and shot Isa Mustafa’s (then the mayor) director of education Remzi 
Salihu, with five bullets while the remaining not fired bullets were turned to the Kosovo 
as a “change” by the assassin. The main reason of this assassination was LDK’s misuse 
and disregard of Kosovo courts. Mr. Salihu’s caseload was one among 70 against Isa 
Mustafa’s clan, not yet legally resolved. There are still 69 awaiting against him and his 
company.  
 
Hashim Thaçi, e frequent clandestine visitor of brothels in Skopje, no longer 
chose these routes once he recruited as his advisor Mrika Kotorri, a former researcher of 
Riinvest. This may be good news as he is now becoming a “patriot” by “consuming” local 
“products.” Another researcher of Riinvest, Besa Zogaj – Gashi, has been sent somewhere 
in the Kosovo Budget Commission. These are not researchers, senior, junior, or 
whatever, but researchers available for opportunism. They do not care if you are a 
“snake” (nom de guerre of Hashim Thaçi), lizard, salamander, dog, illiterate, or criminal. 
The other co-founder and co-owner of Riinvest, Ymer Havolli (the relative of Muhamet 
Mustafa) has been sent to usurp the president of the board position in Kosovo Pension 
and Savings Trust. I do not want to talk now about how their master and PhD thesis were 
prepared are obtained. Once the Kosovo courts are liberated from the misuse of U.S. 
Embassy, I have what to offer about the true research and the degrees that many people 
have obtained, in which I was the main player and engine. Someone is called professor, 
the other lecturer, another deputy minister, their biographies full of rosy pictures, but 
the only thing you will cast a serious doubt about, is what they are capable of doing 
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right now after all those achievements? You will come to a conclusion that they must be 
returned to undergraduate studies.     
   
 The primary weapon of Riinvest is propaganda, blackmails, opportunism, and 
slanders. What its report we are talking about has to do with analysis, senior researchers, 
and international consultants?. Riinvest operates through this strategy, though the 
damage to the public through its pseudo-research is evident. Still worse, Riinvest efforts 
focus on suppressing the truth to justify the funding from KFOS, from Luan Shllaku 
(the executive director) respectively, a known person of intrigues. This network of anti-
science and of money laundering is working well in Kosovo amongst the people who 
prefer to hear what you have to say about them rather than assessing their products, i.e. 
reading their works. Reading in the 21st century outside compulsory requirement (i.e. in 
schools and universities) has become a hated activity and appropriate for ridiculing. A 
typical Albanian will never know what this critical analysis is saying, unless you do not 
tell them. Even if you inform them, again they will rely on what you are telling about 
this article, and would not prefer to read it on their own. Albanians are distracted from 
the comprehensive reading by casting a glimpse to the headlines only.  If you want your 
work disregarded, ask Albanians who make their “assessment” without reading it. We 
have read the report by Riinvest, and we have no reason to believe in your claims about 
them as persons. Few Albanians refused to read a book by Joseph Stiglitz (Globalization 
and Its Discontents) I recommended, under their prejudice that Stiglitz was a Jew and 
ugly in appearance. Also, it would be naïve for us to arbitrarily believe in KFOS as an 
open society when its work shows underground activities, conspiracies, and nepotism. 
How much open the KFOS can be when its executive director Luan Shllaku funds the 
KCSF where the director of projects is Suzana Arni – Shllaku, his wife? During the night, 
they share the same bed, while during the working days the funds of OSI and working 
against others. This fact was reported to the OSI Ombudsman headquarters. The fact 
that no measures have ever been undertaken, indicates that this undeclared mission 
goes on. The only impossible mission of OSI is open society, which can be proven by the 
results and conspiracies on site, and not by its nonsense claim.  
 
Riinvest has its hands blooded in many other scandals, among others, in the so-
called National Strategy for the Development of Kosovo, a project in which around €2.5 
million were appropriated. What really happened to that strategy? What were its results? 
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Where did Kosovo come by that “famous expertise” of Riinvest and conspiracy of Luan 
Shllaku? The strategy withered into the air because it was not a strategy of the purpose 
in which it claimed. The aim of Riinvest was only to launder money, just like the recent 
survey funded by the KCSF. In the “national strategy” Riinvest could not launder the 
money as it wished because of Ramush Haradinaj (politician) who hampered it. With the 
money it was receiving in the name of the strategy, Riinvest was not paying a task force 
working in the project. This became the cause of an unpaid group to publicly denounce 
Riinvest, in particular it executive director Muhamet Sadiku. The message was also 
directed to Luan Shllaku as one of the players in the strategy. The “national strategy” 
became a national scandal. But Riinvest does not care at all if someone tells the world 
that 2x3=6, and not 20! “We are getting the money, let the dogs bark behind against us”, 
is the most preferred approach and claim by Riinvest, which I have experienced with 
them for years. This type of “research expertise” should be made available and explained 
to the public, in the name of which Riinvest prepares the corrupted or pseudo research. 
We should be correct to assess the Riinvest’s expertise in this sector. It is easy to make a 
way through criminal activities, then pretend to become honest. Historical experience 
tells us that the greatest evils never wanted to pursue their activities to infinity, but to a 
certain degree until they deemed them as “necessary” to bring their planned “everlasting 
peace” and build a “paradise” on earth. Hitler prosecuted the Jews, and wanted a 
“lebensraum” (living space) in Soviet Union for German people. Stalin wanted (and 
fought about) the triumph of communism at a high cost among the Soviets and Eastern 
Europeans. Milosevic wanted ethnic cleansing of Albanians from Kosovo. Had their 
plans come into full-scale fulfillment, there was no reason for them to remain brutal 
dictators forever.  
 
According to the data we have at our disposal, all companies in Kosovo organized 
on shareholding bases, including Riinvest, and especially the profit making banks, do 
not pay taxes on dividends, which is the tax on profit, alternatively better known as 
Corporate Income Tax. The release from this tax is provided by Article 7, Point 1.3 of the 
Law No. 03/L-162 on Corporate Income Tax (CIT), approved by the Assembly of the 
Republic of Kosovo on 29 December 2009. The Law in the article referred to, in Section 
II “Income exempt from tax”, says: “1.3. Dividends received by resident and non-resident 
taxpayers.” It implies that, if you are a kind of taxpayer, e.g. of personal incomes and/or 
of Value Added Tax (VAT), you do not need to pay a single penny for profit tax that you 
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generate as dividends from the shares. In many countries, especially in those with social 
market economy, profit tax is very high (40% or more). The main political battle in the 
politics of the United States mostly gravitates around what policy the Treasury 
Department should follow. The republicans as the Party of Right traditionally tend to 
favor lower tax rates with the aim of giving businesses, namely large corporations, 
greater maneuvering space and freedom for growth. The rival democratic camp or the 
Left Party in principle promotes higher differentiated tax rates, i.e. proportionally taxing 
more the rich, and less the poorer as a kind of social justice. In both cases, the impact 
and result ideally may be the same in aggregate terms, e.g. in the state budget, 
economy, businesses in general, and the population. The Republicans would justify their 
core policy with the belief: “Let us give the corporations more freedom to act, growth, 
innovation and development, thus we can be in a better position to give the hand to the 
population with more goods and services, the chance of employment and increasing the 
demand through consumption.” The Democrats from their camp, in opposing this 
policy, may come out with their alternative: “Taxing less the rich, indeed does enable the 
growth of corporations to extent of even creating monopolies by undermining the 
prospects for growth of small businesses, the state budget may have less funds to 
implement more efficiently the reforms in education and healthcare as vital sectors of 
long term healthier economy. Instead of empowering the current corporations, we strive 
for greater opportunities for new businesses and growing of small ones.” We see great 
alternatives within only two large political parties. Each of the two competitive 
alternatives can produce positive results. This validates once again our attitude that 
competition can exist between two entities, and the customers have good choices. But 
apart from the banks, why there is no competition between dozens political parties in 
Kosovo? Former U.S. President, the republican Ronald Reagan, is credited for the 
following quote: “If it moves, tax it. If it keeps moving, regulate it. And if it stops 
moving, subsidize it. After all, what is always needed, is to keep things working, in 
perspective, going ahead, through only two or more alternatives, and with whatever 
ideology.     
 
The CIT rate in Kosovo is fairly low, only 10% of the value, but this does not 
apply to those who receive the dividends as profit. The primary objective of halving the 
CIT rate from 20% to 10% was to enrich the few richer, and increasing the VAT from 
15% to 16% to further impoverish a very large number of the poor (Mulaj, 2009). And 
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what is the (not yet) end result? As of 2014, dozens of buses full of Albanian asylum 
seekers leaving Kosovo within a week. This outflow intensified sharply during the time 
when Riinvest was using the report on banking sector as propaganda in USAID and OSI 
funded TV “KTV” and the daily newspaper “Koha Ditore”. Following the breakthrough 
of political stalemate in mid December 2014, in which Isa Mustafa was elected Prime 
Minister, the number of buses full of asylum seekers leaving Kosovo, reached 5 per day. 
There has been no such a record of escape from Kosovo even during the Serbian 
repressive rule, excluding the period of armed conflict and NATO intervention. In the 
1990s, the Milosevic regime was responsible of ethnic cleansing of Albanians. Your 
inevitable question is: but who is now? I can assure any of you that no person is leaving 
Kosovo to end up in a “better” place such as prison camps in Hungary and underground 
parking places in France because of me, but because of Isa Mustafa, Luan Shllaku, 
USAID policy with its aid, and the entirely criminalized politics and institutions of 
Kosovo. In my opinion, those people leaving Kosovo to find a place abroad, even in 
prison, deserve such an imposed deportation until they judge the work by its nature and 
content, not by the person or country as they are always used to. For instance, if ethnic 
cleansing and crimes are committed by the Serbs, in their belief it is wrong, and if the 
same happens under Isa Mustafa and U.S. Embassy policy, it is fine. The important thing 
for them is just to know who is behind or causes it, not what the harm is. This is a typical 
(wrong) perception by majority of the population. Riinvest can be praised for its 
approach based on perceptions to fit into the mentality of the population. Although the 
direction of this causality is not clear, the evidence points more from Riinvest to the 
public. When you want to judge on perceptions, and if many will say that you are a 
psychopath, they truly believe that you actually are. When I published “Tax Reform in 
Emerging Transition: Is Kosovo’s NGOs and Government Mathematical Economics 
Rational?”, there were perceptions inside the Ministry of Economy and Finance calling it 
“a work by the psychopath!” That was an easy approach to persuade those people who 
later would run away abroad at any cost. The “psychopath” was not so dangerous to force 
them leaving and is urging them to stand and fight, and if necessary to die for their 
country in the battle against their leaders who are causing the ethnic cleansing. They 
must never make a distinction between Milosevic and any Albanian speaker as far as the 
same phenomenon is concerned – ethnic cleansing.      
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If the reader wants to read more about the recent report by Riinvest, see also:  
 
Aliu, Florin and Gjinovci, Rron (2014a), “Kosovo Banking Oligarchy: An Illusion for 
Competition”, in Albanian, available at:  http://www.zeri.info/ekonomia/4646/oligarkia-
bankare-e-kosoves-iluzioni-per-konkurrencen/, Part I, retrieved from December 15, 2015. 
 
Aliu, Florin and Gjinovci, Rron (2014b), “Kosovo Banking Oligarchy: An Illusion for 
Competition”, in Albanian, available at: http://zeri.info/ekonomia/5605/oligarkia-bankare-
e-kosoves-iluzioni-per-konkurrencen/ Part II, retrieved from December 15, 2015. 
 
On the “unique” methodology of Riinvest, see:  
 
http://www.albaniapress.com/lajme/12217/Shovinizmi-statistikor-antikombetar-i-UDB-
sheve-shqip-dhe-anglishtfoles.html; 
 
http://www.albaniapress.com/lajme/14636/Krimet-kunder-njerezimit-dhe-ekonomise-me-
statistika.html.  
 
When An Entire Nation does not want to Understand Elementary School Mathematics in 
Practice, available at:  
 
Etc.  
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